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Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist
Finance
PouYAN BOHLOUL, GABRIELA CHAMBI, SANDRA FADEL, NICOLE

S.

HEALY, EUNJUNG PARK, AND CHRISTINA ROBERTSON*

I.

Introduction

This past year, anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist
financing (CTF) regimes have been challenged to keep pace with technology
and increasingly sophisticated global money laundering networks. Virtual
currencies (VC) continue to evolve and authorities worldwide struggle with
how to regulate and police these payment technologies. Efforts at VC
legislation generally focus on protecting the integrity of the financial system,
but regulators are also increasingly sensitive to the potential social benefits
of the underlying technology.

A.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN VIRTUAL CURRENCY

1.

Virtual Currency Overview

"Virtual currency (VC) is a digital representation of value" that can be
traded online and functions as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, or a
means to store value.1 VC is global and operates outside traditional financial
systems. VC "is not issued or guaranteed by any jurisdiction" but rather
derives value from community members.
VC is a general term that represents a broad array of quickly evolving
technologies that vary in degree of sophistication. Bitcoin is the most
popular VC and represents a subclass of VC, cryptocurrency. There are
currently over 700 different cryptocurrencies in operation; the market cap of
* Pouyan Bohloul, Esq., is a regular contributor to The World Bank Group's Doing
Business Project. He received his J.D. from Florida State University College of Law and is
licensed to practice law in Iran. Gabriela Chambi, JD candidate 2017, and Sandra Fadel, JD
candidate 2017, attend American University Washington College of Law. Nicole S. Healy is a
partner at Ropers Majeski Kohn & Bentley, P.C., in Redwood City, California, where her
practice focuses on litigation including business disputes, securities violations, and shareholder
litigation. Eunjung Park is an Associate in Anti Money Laundering Compliance at Societe
Generale. Ms. Park received her law degree from American University, Washington College of
Law in 2009, and previously worked for the African Development Bank Christina Robertson is
a compliance attorney in Kansas City, Missouri.
1. See FIN. Ac-iON TASK FORCE, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES: KEY DErINTIONS AND
POTENTIAL AML/CFT RISKs 4 (2014), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/
reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-and-potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf.
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the twenty-five largest cryptocurrencies exceeds twelve billion dollars.2
Though cryptocurrencies have struggled to gain widespread acceptance as a
daily payment method to purchase goods or services, adoption rates
continue to rise. 3
Cryptocurrencies allow anyone with computer access to efficiently obtain
funding or make payments worldwide. The VCs pose considerable risk as
potential vehicles for money laundering and terrorist financing because they
are anonymous or pseudo-anonymous and mostly unregulated.
A flurry of ransomeware attacks this year brought attention to Bitcoin as a
means to facilitate and mask criminal activity.4 In a typical ransomeware
attack, an individual or organization's computer or software is compromised
by cybercriminals who then encrypt and hold that encrypted data hostage.
Bitcoin is the preferred method of payment for ransomware attacks because
funds can be sent or received from anywhere and are challenging to trace.5
The risk to AML and CTF efforts posed by VCs will continue to grow as
the technology matures. The current blockchain technology that supports
Bitcoin makes tracing a transaction challenging but not impossible.6 But
Zero-proof is a next generation technology that removes all identifying
information from a payment, and thus renders the transaction untraceable.7
Zcash, the first cryptocurrency to utilize this technology, promotes on its
website "total payment confidentiality."8

2.

CriminalProsecution
Three U.S. cases from 2016 highlight the challenges of prosecuting AML

cases that involve VC. The first case demonstrates that AML regulation of
VC requires complex and multi-jurisdictional cooperation; seventeen
countries and numerous domestic and foreign agencies and intelligence units
2. See CryptoCurrency Market Capitalizations, CoiNMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com
(last updated Mar. 12, 2017, 6:20 PM).
3. See DONG HE ET AL., VIRTUAL CURRENCIES ANI) BEYOND: INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS 17
(2016), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdnl6O3.pdf; see also RYAN FARELL, AN
ANALYSIS OF1 TIE CRYT-FOCURRENCY INDUSTRY 14 (Univ. of Pa. ScholarlyCommons, 2015),
http://repository.upenn.edu/wharton-research-scholars/130.
4. See Robert McMillan, In the Bitcoin Era, RansornewareAttacks Surge, WALL ST. J., https://
www.wsj.com/articles/in-the-bitcoin-era-ransomware-attacks-surge-1471616632?mg=id-wsj
(last updated Aug. 19, 2016, 11:59 PM).
5. Id.
6. See Steven Norton, CIO Explainer: What is Blockchain?, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 2, 2016, 12:49
AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2016/02/02/cio-explainer-what-is-blockchain/.
7. See Joseph Mari, When Blockchain, Cryptocurrencies, and AML Meet, BANKING EXCHANGE
(Nov. 7, 2016, 17:36), http://www.bankingexchange.com/news-feed/item/6547-whenblockchain-cryptocurrencies-and-aml-meet?temid=63 7.
8. See Press Release, Maureen Walsh, Zcash Launches at the First Open, Permmissionless
Fin. Sys. Employing Zero-Knowledge Sec. (Oct. 28, 2016), https://z.cash/support/zcashsprout-launch.html.
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contributed to the Liberty Reserve investigation.9 State v. Espinoza and
Coin.mx illustrate the importance of modernizing AML statutes to include
technology-based money laundering tools and the need for a coordinated
approach to VC regulation.o
In May 2016, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York sentenced Arthur Budovsky, the founder of Liberty Reserve, a digital
currency company, to twenty years in prison for running an extensive VCbased money laundering operation." Budovsky pled guilty to one count of
conspiring to commit money laundering in January 2016.12 Liberty Reserve
laundered more than $250 million since its inception by converting criminal
proceeds into its branded VC, Liberty Dollars (LR), processing the
transactions, and then converting the VC into cash.13 The Liberty Dollar
was a predecessor to Bitcoin. Liberty Reserve employed insufficient and
ineffective AML controls and failed to validate user identities.'4 Customers
would make deposits and withdrawals through third-party currency
exchangers located in various third-party countries, including Malaysia,
Nigeria, and Russia.s As a result, account holders exchanged LR in nearly
untraceable transactions. Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell
stated that Budovsky's twenty-year sentence demonstrates that "money
laundering through the use of virtual currencies is still money laundering,
and that online crime is still crime."16
9. See Founder of Liberey Reserve Pleads Guilty to LaunderingMore Than $250 Million through
His Digital Currency Business, Ti-ir UNITED STATEs DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Jan. 29, 2016),
2
50https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/founder-liberty-reserve-pleads-guilty-laundering-moremillion-through-his-digital.
10. Jeffrey K. Berns, Recent VC Ruling Emphasizes Why Congress Needs to Act Promptly to Pass VC
Legislation, BERSWEiss LLP (Sept. 21, 2016, 2:13 PM), https://www.lawll1.com/recent-vcruling-emphasizes-why-congress-needs-to-act-promptly-to-pass-v-legislation.
11. See id.; Liberty Reserve FounderArthur Budovsky Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court to 20
Years for Laundering Hundreds of Millions of Dollars Through His Global Digital Currency Business,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUST. (May 6, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/liberty2
reserve-founder-arthur-budovsky-sentenced-manhattan-federal-court- 0-years.
12. See Founder of Liberty Reserve Pleads Guilty to LaunderingMore Than $250 Million Through
His Digital Currency Business, supra note 9; see also Liberty Reserve Founder Arthur Budovsky
Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court to 20 Years for Laundering Hundreds of Millions of Dollars
Through His Global Digital Currency Business, supra note 11.
13. See Founder of Liberty Reserve Pleads Guilty to LaunderingMore Than $250 Million Through
His Digital Currency Business, supra note 9; see also Liberty Reserve Founder Arthur Budovsky
Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court to 20 Years for Laundering Hundreds of Millions of Dollars
Through His Global Digital Currency Business, supra note 11.
14. Libeny Reserve FounderArthur Budovsky Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court to 20 Yearsfor
Laundering Hundreds of Millions of Dollars Through His Global Digital Currency Business, supra
note 11.
15. Alan Brill & Lonnie Keene, Cryptocurrencies: The Next Generation of TerroristFinancing?,6
Dru. AGAINST TERRORISM REv. 7, 7-30 (2014).

16. Liberty Reserve FounderArthur Budovsky Sentenced in Manhattan FederalCourt to 20 Yearsfor
Laundering Hundreds of Millions of Dollars Through His Global Digital Currency Business, supra
note 11.
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On the other hand, in State v. Espinoza, Miami-Dade County Circuit
Court Judge Teresa Pooler dismissed felony anti-money laundering charges
against a website developer stating that Bitcoins are not a "monetary
instrument" or "payment instrument" as defined by statute and that "money
transmission" does not include the sale of Bitcoin.17 The judge further
noted that "virtual currency" is not included as a category within the
statutory definition of "monetary instrument" and that Bitcoin does not fall
within any of the existing categories.I8
The defendant sold Bitcoins to an undercover agent who claimed that he
would use the bitcoins to buy stolen credit cards.', Judge Pooler stated that
"[n]othing in our frame of reference allows us to accurately define or
describe Bitcoin."20 In her analysis, Judge Pooler referenced the Internal
Revenue's classification of virtual currency as property before concluding
that "Bitcoin has a long way to go before it is the equivalent of money."21

Shortly thereafter, a federal judge in New York ruled in Coin.mx that
. . means of payment."22 In
July 2015, Anthony Murgio was arrested for operating an illegal online
Bitcoin exchange called Coin.mx and charged with violating federal antimoney laundering laws.23 Investigators believe Murgio knowingly facilitated
payments for victims of the ransomware attacks, and thus, enabled the
attacks. Murgio sought to dismiss charges against him by arguing that
Bitcoins are not "funds" under the federal law prohibiting the operation of
an unlicensed money transmitting business. In September 2016, Judge
Alison Nathan of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York rejected Murgio's argument ruling that "Bitcoins are funds within the
Bitcoins "function as pecuniary resources and .

plain meaning of that term."24

17. See David Ovalle, Bitcoin Not Money, Miami Judge Rules in Dismissing Laundering Charges,
MIAMI HERALD (July 25, 2016, 10:22 AM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/crime/

.

article91682102.html; see also State v. Espinoza, No. F14-2923, slip op. (Fla. 11th Cir. 2016).
18. See Espinoza, No. F14-2923at 6-7.
19. See Ovalle, supra note 13 at 2; see also Patricia Hurtado & Susannah Nesmith, FloridaState
Judge Rules Bitcoin Doesn't Qualify as Money, BLOOMFRG TEcii. (July 25, 2016, 8:11 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-25/florida-state-judge-rules-bitcoindoesn-t-qualify-as-money.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 6.
22. Jonathan Stempel, Bitcoin Is Money, U.S. Judge Says in Case Tied to JPMorgan Hack,
Ri~u-ruEs (Sept. 19, 2016, 8:08 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-jpmorgan-cyberbitcoin-idUSKCN1 IP2DE.
23. See id.
24. Id.
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Regulatory Response

a. Japan
Japan enacted a law in May 2016 to regulate VC.25 The new law defines
VC as "asset-like values" and will go into effect one year from its adoption.
The law requires that exchanges register with the Financial Services Agency
(FSA).26 Exchanges will also be subject to AML and know your customer
(KYC) obligations.27 The FSA will conduct on-site inspections and issue
administrative orders as needed to ensure compliance.28

b.

China

Since 2013, The People's Bank of China has prohibited financial
institutions and employees from dealing in Bitcoin.29 The Cyberspace
Administration of China acknowledged in October 2015 the innovation
potential of Bitcoin's underlying technology, and in January 2016 the
People's Bank of China hinted at plans to develop its own VC.30
c.

Russia

In 2014, the Russian Ministry of Finance issued legislation that banned
the use, creation, and distribution of VC. In August 2016, the Ministry
proposed an amendment to the VC ban that would treat VC as "foreign
currency" to be used by Russians outside of Russia.31
d.

United Kingdom

Jersey, a self-governing dependency of the United Kingdom, recently
amended its AML legislation to include virtual currency exchange services.32
The Proceeds of Crime Regulations went into effect in September and
requires that VC exchanges register with, and are supervised by, the Jersey
25. See Diet Oks Bill to Regulate Virtual Currency Exchanges, Ti InJAPAN TIM Es, http://www.jap
antimes.co.jp/news/2016/05/25/business/diet-oks-bill-regulate-virtual-currency-exchanges/#
.WMYgE7G-Ixe (last visited Mar. 13, 2017).
26. David Meyer, Burned by Bitcoin Scandal, Japan is Introducing Controls, FORTUNE (May 26,
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/26/japan-bitcoin-exchanges/.
27. Naoya Ariyoshi, Susumu Tanizawa, & Hideki Katagiri, Japan: the Essential Points of the
Amendments to the Regulation on Virtual Currency Exchange Services, MONDAQ (an. 21, 2017),
http://www.mondaq.com/x/554128/Financial+Servicesfrhe+Essential+Points+Of+The+Amend
ments+To+The+Regulation+On+Virtual+Currency+Exchange+Services.
28. See Diet Oks Bill to Regulate Virtual Currency Exchanges, supra note 25.
29. See Valentin Schmid, What Is Going On with China and Bitcoins?, Epoci-i Timis (une 1,
2016, 2:48 PM), http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/2080774-what-is-going-on-with-chinaand-bitcoin/.
30. See id.; Sophia Yan, China Wants to Launch Its Own DigitalCurrency, CNN (an. 22, 2016,
1:02 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/21/technology/china-digital-currency/.
31. Russia to Allow Foreign Trading of Virtual Currency, BrrLEGAL (Aug. 11, 2016), http://
bitlegal.io/2016/08/1 1/russia-to-allow-foreign-trading-of-virtual-currency/.
32. Id.

Published by SMU Scholar, 2017

5

The Year in Review, Vol. 51, No. 1 [2017], Art. 28
436

THE YEAR IN REVIEW

[VOL. 51

Financial Services Commission.33 Jersey intends to establish itself as an
international center for digital industries, and to this end, the regulation
provides an exception for smaller exchanges, which are intended to create a
"regulatory sandbox" to encourage innovation.34

B.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND
COUNTER-TERRORISM

1.

Financing

The Panama Papers incident in May revealed how effectively assets can be
transferred and hidden offshore.5 Though the creation of offshore legal
entities is not evidence of illegal activity per se, the system is susceptible to
abuse by tax evaders, terrorists, and money launderers.36 Of note in the
Panama Papers data leak, and of interest to AML and CTF professionals, is
the sophisticated and robust global network of entities and intermediaries
that mask the identity of beneficial owners, disguise transactions, and hide
funds.37 In response, AML and CTF programs are bolstering customer due
diligence requirements in an effort to better expose and monitor beneficial
ownership, and thus preserve the integrity of established financial systems.
2.

Regulatory Response in the United States

In May 2016, the U.S. Treasury Department's Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued final rules under the Bank Secrecy
Act (BSA) to clarify and enhance customer due diligence (CDD)
requirements and focus on beneficial owner identification.39 The new rules
are effective July 1, 2016, but covered entities have until May 11, 2018, to
33. Proceeds of Crime (Supervisory Bodies) (Virtual Currency Exchange Business)
(Exemption) (Jersey) Order 2016, availableat https://www.jerseylaw.je/laws/enacted/Pages/RO101-2016.aspx.
34. SaraJones, Virtual Currency Regulation in Jersey Takes Effect, OGIER (Apr. 10, 2016), https://
www.ogier.com/publications/virtual-currency-regulation-in-jersey-takes-effect; see also Digital
Jersey Welcomes Innovative Regulation for Virtual Currency, DiGnTAL JERSEY (Sept. 26, 2016),
https://www.digital.je/news/regulation-for-virtual-currency.
35. The Panama Papers references a data leak of 11.5 million files from Mossack Fonseca, a
Panama-based law firm in 2016. The leaked records disclosed the attorney-client records of
more than 200,000 offshore entities. See Frederik Obermaier et al., About the Panama Papers,
SUDDEUTSCHE ZEIruNG, http://panamapapers.sueddeutsche.de/articles/56febff0albb8d3c34
95adf4/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2016); Giant Leak of Offihore FinancialRecords Exposes Global Array
of Crime and Corruption, INT'L CONSORTIUM Or INVESTIGATTVE JOURNALISTS (Apr. 3, 2016),
https://panamapapers.icij.org/20160403-panama-papers-global-overview.html.
36. Obermaier et al., supra note 35.
37. Giant Leak of Offshore FinancialRecords Exposes Global Array of Crime and Corruption, supra
note 35.
38. See Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 81 Fed. Reg. 29,398
(May 11, 2016) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, et al.), https://www.federal
register.gov/documents/2016/05/11/2016-10567/customer-due-diligence-requirements-forfinancial-institutions.
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comply. Covered entities include the following: "[b]anks; brokers or dealers
in securities; mutual funds; and futures commission merchants and . .
brokers in commodities."39 The BSA is the primary AML law in the United
States and, as amended by the USA Patriot Act, incorporates CTF
requirements as well.
The new rules outline the four core elements of an effective CDD
program: customer identification and verification; beneficial ownership
identification and verification; risk profiling based on an understanding of
customer relationships; and ongoing transaction and risk-based customer
monitoring.40
Beneficial ownership of all legal entities must be identified and verified at
account opening.41 FinCEN provides a form that provides the required
beneficial ownership information. In the absence of any knowledge that
would reasonably call into question the reliability of the information,
covered entities may rely on ownership information provided by the
customer. 42 FinCEN considers beneficial ownership to include not just
those individuals with an equity interest in the legal entity but also those
who exercise control over the entity. FinCEN believes if covered entities
know the identity of the individuals that own or control their legal entity
customers and comply with AML and CTF regulations, criminals will be
denied access to the United States financial system. In addition, this insight
into beneficial ownership will assist law enforcement in investigations,
prevent financial sanction evasion, and advance U.S. compliance with
international AML standards and commitments.43
3.

Enforcement Challenges in the United States

FinCEN's suspicious activity reporting requirement informs the
enforcement arm of the U.S. AML/CTF regulatory scheme. This year the
United States faced a challenge to the application of AML enforcement
measures that function to protect the U.S. financial system from exposure to
high-risk activity. Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act authorizes the
FinCEN to "impose a variety of special measures against institutions that it
finds to be of primary money-laundering concern . . . ." The first four of

these five special measures may be authorized by agency order; FinCEN
"may impose the fifth special measure . .. only by rulemaking."44 A list of
the jurisdictions and institutions subject to these special measures, as well as
links to FinCEN's findings and the special measures imposed on various
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 29,298.
Id. at 29,431.
See id.; see also 31 U.S.C § 5318A(a)(2)(B)-(C) (stating the first through fourth special

measures may be impose by "regulation, order, or otherwise as permitted by law," however, the
fifth special measure may only be imposed by regulation, after providing for notice and
comment).
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institutions, is available at the agency's website.45 FinCEN has only imposed
such a final rule seven times since 2004. Financial institutions have sought
judicial review of FinCEN's Section 311 designations even more rarely.46
In a recent case challenging a Section 311 designation, FBME Bank Ltd.
(FBME), a Tanzanian bank, obtained a preliminary injunction barring
implementation of FinCEN's final rule and fifth special measure, which
would have frozen FBME out of the U.S. financial markets.47 While the
court would "not .

.

. second guess FinCEN's exercise of its broad discretion

in finding that FBME poses a primary money laundering concern," it found
that FinCEN had not complied with the notice provisions of the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) because it had failed to supply FBME
with the unclassified and otherwise unprotected evidence on which it based
its decision to bar the bank's access to the United States financial system and
further failed to address adequately whether it had considered alternatives to
barring the bank from the United States financial system. 48 The court found
that FinCEN's failure to disclose non-classified and unprotected
information during the final rule's notice and comment period was a
procedural error that deprived FBME of an opportunity to review and
comment on those materials.49 Further, FinCEN had not adequately
described whether it had considered alternatives to the Section 311
designation, such as imposing conditions on opening or maintaining
correspondent accounts, rather than entirely prohibiting such accounts. 50
Rather than appeal the ruling, FinCEN asked the district court to remand
the matter to the agency so that it could have what the court termed a "doover." That is, FinCEN requested "an opportunity to correct any mistakes
it might have made the first time around and to promulgate-following
proper procedures-the same rule, a new rule altogether, or perhaps even no
rule at all."si The court agreed, stayed its ruling, and remanding the case to
FinCEN.52 In its order, the court noted that voluntary remand is favored
where the agency has decided to re-consider its decisions and re-start the
45. See 311 Special Meas-ures, FINCEN, https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-andregulations/3 1 1-special-measures (last visited Mar. 13, 2017).

46. See FBME Bank Ltd., 2016 WL 5108018, at *4 (citing Section 311-Special Measures,
FinCEN, https://www.fincen.gov/statutes-regs/patriot/section311.html).

47. See FBME Bank Ltd. v. Lew, 125 F. Supp. 3d 109 (D.D.C. 2015) (mem. op.) (giving
opinion granting preliminary injunction); see also § 5318A(b)(5) (stating certain payable-through
or correspondent accounts may be prohibited).

48. See FBME Bank Ltd., 125 F. Supp. at 114. FinCEN had claimed that "FBME openly
advertises the bank to its potential customer base as willing to facilitate the evasion of AML

regulations. In addition, FBME solicits and is widely recognized by its high-risk customers for
ease of use." FinCEN Takes Action to Protect U.S. Financial System, FINCEN (July 17, 2014),
https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-takes-action-protect-us-financial-system.

49.
50.
5 1.
52.

See FMBE Bank Ltd , 125 F. Supp. at 118.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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rulemaking process.5 3 Moreover, the court found that the remand would not
unduly prejudice FBME.54
Thereafter, on March 31, 2016, FinCEN published a final rule under
Section 311, designating FBME as a "financial institution of primary money
laundering concern."ss The order would have gone into effect 120 days
from publication, but FMBE again challenged it.56 On September 20, 2016,
FBME won a second injunction against FinCEN's designation, including on
the grounds that FinCEN's disclosures to FBME were insufficient.57 While
the FBME case is limited to its facts, it may encourage other financial
institutions to challenge FinCEN's Section 311 rulemaking process.
The FBME case highlights the tension between FinCEN's use of data
drawn from SARs, which have not been disclosed to the financial institution
but from which the agency has drawn conclusions regarding purportedly
suspicious transactions and the institution's AML controls and the
imposition of sanctions on the institution.ss In FBME Bank Ltd. v. Lew, the
court concluded that the use of aggregate SAR information put the bank on
53. Id. at 73.
54. Id.
55. See Imposition of Special Measure Against FBME Bank Ltd., Formerly Known as the
Federal Bank of the Middle East Ltd., as a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering
Concern, 81 Fed. Reg. 18480 (Mar. 31, 2016) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 1010), https://
www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FBMEFR_20160325.pdf; FinCEN Issues Final Rule
Imposing a Prohibition on the Opening or Maintainingof CorrespondentAccounts for, or on Behalf of
FBME Bank Ltd., FINCEN, https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/20160325.pdf
(last visited Mar. 13, 2017).
56. See FinCEN Issues Final Rule Imposing a Prohibition on the Opening or Maintaining of
CorrespondentAccounts for, or on Behalf of, FBME Bank Ltd., supra note 55.
57. See FBME Bank Ltd. v. Lew, No. 15-CV-01270 (CRC), 2016 WL 5108018, at *30
(D.D.C Sept. 20, 2016) (mem. op.); see also Ben DiPietro, FBME Bank Wins Second Injunction
Against FinCEN Rule, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2016, 4:33 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
riskandcompliance/2016/09/2 1/fbme-bank-wins-second-injunction-against-fincen-rule/.
Analyzing FinCEN's Section 311 final rulemaking pursuant to the APA, in particular, FBME's
challenge to the final rule under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) on the basis that FinCEN's rulemaking was
arbitrary and capricious, the district court found that FinCEN failed to fully comply with two
notice provisions but that the errors were harmless. See FBME Bank Ltd., 2016 WL 5108018, at
*5. More significantly, the court found that FinCEN had not adequately responded to certain
comments from FBME. See id. at *30. On that basis, the court again stayed implementation of
the final rule. See id.
58. See FBME Bank Ltd., 2016 WL 5108018, at *7 (citing Notice of Finding That FBME Bank
Ltd., Formerly Known as Federal Bank of the Middle East, Ltd., Is a Financial Institution of
Primary Money Laundering Concern, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,639, 42,640 ([uly 22, 2014), https://
www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/special-measure/FBME_- NOF.pdf). The court noted that,
in its proposed final rule, FinCEN stated that between April 2013 and April 2014, "FBME
conducted at least $387 million in wire transfers through the U.S. financial system that
exhibited indicators of high-risk money laundering typologies, including widespread shell
company activity, short-term 'surge' wire activity, structuring, and high-risk business
customers" and that "FBME was involved in at least 4,500 suspicious wire transfers through
U.S. correspondent accounts that totaled at least $875 million between November 2006 and
March 2013." FBME Bank Ltd., 2016 WL 5108018, at *7.
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notice of FinCEN's concerns, and access to individual SARs would not have
assisted the bank's efforts to push back against the Section 311 designation
where FinCEN had discussed its concerns regarding AML controls at length
with the bank.59 These facts are unique to this case, however, and financial
institutions' concerns regarding due process in like situations are not
frivolous.
In another recent case, FinCEN first issued and then withdrew its Section
311 findings and notice of proposed rulemaking in which it designated
Banca Privada d'Andorra (BPA) an institution of special money-laundering
concern.60
FinCEN explained its decision by stating that "BPA no longer operates in
a manner that poses a threat to the U.S. financial system."61 That
determination followed the bank's takeover by the Andorran banking
authorities in which the Andorran government assumed control of the
bank's "management and operations, arrested the chief executive officer on
money laundering charges, and are in the final stages of implementing a
resolution plan that is isolating the assets, liabilities, and clients of BPA that
raise money laundering concerns."62 As a result of the takeover, BPA's assets
were placed into a new entity, Vall Bank, which was later sold.63

In both of these cases, the banks resisted FinCEN's Section 311
designation and sought more information regarding the basis for the
agency's determination. Because each Section 311 determination is based on
the specific facts and circumstances presented, however, and because so few
Section 311 final rules have been sought or challenged, it is difficult to draw
any general conclusions regarding the circumstances under which courts will
affirm FinCEN's designations. It seems likely, however, that the more
59. See id., at *8.
60. See Fin CEN Names Banca Privada d'Andorra a ForeignFinancialInstitution of PrimaryMoney
Laundering Concern, FINCEN (Mar. 10, 2015), https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/
fincen-names-banca-privada-dandorra-foreign-financial-institution-primary-money;
Notice
Regarding the Withdrawalsof Findingsand ProposedRulemakings Under Section 311, FINCEN (Feb.
19, 2016), https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/notice-regarding-withdrawals-findingsand-proposed-rulemakings-under-section-311. In October 2015, the Cierco family, the
majority shareholders of Banca Privada d'Andorra, filed suit in Washington, D.C., asking the
court to rescind the Section 311 designation. See Ramon and Higini Cierco File Lawsuit Against
the U.S. Treasury and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Claiming the Agency's Actions
Against Banca Privada d'Andorra Are Wholly Unjustified and Unconstitutional, PR NEWSWIRE
(Oct. 17, 2015, 13:12), http://www.pmewswire.com/news-releases/ramon-and-higini-ciercofile-lawsuit-against-the-us-treasury-and-the-financial-crimes-enforcement-network-claimingthe-agencys-actions-against-banca-privada-dandorra-are-wholly-unjustified-and-unconsti
tutional-300155903.htnl.
61. Notice Regarding the Withdrawals of Findings and Proposed Rulemakings under Section 311,
supra note 60.
62. See id.
63. The Ciercos sued the Treasury Department over the Section 311 findings. The court
dismissed the case as moot where the shareholders obtained the relief requested when FinCEN
withdrew its findings. See Cierco v. Lew, 190 F. Supp. 3d 16, 18-19, 21 (D.D.C. 2016) (mem.
op.) (dismissing complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for mootness).
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generalized APA analysis followed by the court in FBME will provide
guidance for future judicial review of Section 311 rulemaking.
4.

Regulatory Response in the European Union

In May 2015, the European Union (EU) adopted the Fourth Anti-Money
Laundering Directive (4AMLD) to improve the effectiveness of the EU's
efforts to detect and prevent money laundering and terrorist financing.64 On
July 5, 2016, the European Commission approved a proposal (Proposal) to
amend the 4AMLD.65 The Proposal introduces new requirements, modifies
current requirements, and promotes increased collaboration among Member
States.
Each EU Member State must transpose, or adopt laws to implement, the
directive. The Proposal accelerates the 4AMLD transposition deadlineg of
June 26, 2017; all EU Member States must now transpose and enter
4AMLD into force by January 1, 2017.66
The issues addressed by the Proposal include: terrorist financing risks
posed by virtual currencies, risks linked to anonymous pre-paid instruments,
the limited information powers of EU Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs),
enhanced due diligence for high risk countries, and access to beneficial
ownership information.
Obliged entities are defined by and subject to the requirements of the
4AMLD.67 The Proposal broadens the scope of obliged entities to include
VC platforms offering exchange services between virtual and fiat currencies
and custodian wallet providers.68
Public authorities within the EU do not currently monitor VC transfers;
no specific rules exist at the Union or Member State level that would
establish a monitoring framework.69 Recognizing that this gap in
enforcement may be exploited by those engaged in money-laundering or
terrorist financing, the Proposal requires that exchanges and virtual currency
custodians implement preventive AML measures and report suspicious
64. Directive 2015/849, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on
the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for Purposes of Money Laundering or
Terrorist Financing, amending Regulation No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the
Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council

and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC, 2015 OJ. (L 141) 1 [hereinafter 4AMLD].
65. Proposalfora Directive of the European Parliamentand of the CouncilAmending Directive (EU)
2015/849 of the European Parliamentand of the Council of20 May 2015 on the Prevention of the Use
of the FinancialSystem for the Purposes of Money Laundering or Terrorist Financingand Amending

Directive 2009/101/EC, COM (2016) 450 final (uly 5, 2016) [hereinafter Proposal.
66. See id. at 4.
67. See 4AMLD, supra note 64 at art. 2.
68. See Proposal, supra note 65 at 12.

69. See id.
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transactions.70 As obliged entities, they are also subject to online financial
data and data privacy obligations.71
Acknowledging both the terrorist financing risks and legitimate social
utility of pre-paid cards, 4AMLD Article 12 authorizes Member States to
waive certain CDD requirements for obliged entities when the transaction
falls below a certain threshold.72 The Proposal lowers the CDD transaction

threshold of 4AMLD from

250 to

150.73 Additionally, the Proposal

requires that Member States enact controls to ensure that anonymous
prepaid cards used within the Union but issued outside the Union are
subject to issuing requirements equivalent to those of the EU.74
The Proposal clarifies that closed loop cards are low risk for money
laundering and terrorist financing and are therefore outside the scope of
4AMLD. Closed loop cards are prepaid cards that can only be used within a
limited network or to acquire a limited range of goods and services."
FIUs are public authorities within a Member State that collect, identify,
and analyze information about suspicious transactions. FIUs in certain
Member States can only request information from an obliged entity once a
suspicious activity report (SAR) has been filed. As a result, these FIUs are
prevented from gaining timely access to information held by those obliged
entities on payment accounts and account holder identities. To accelerate
the detection of terrorist financing and money laundering, and improve the
cooperation across borders, FIUs must be able to obtain information from
obliged entities and have timely access to relevant financial, administrative,
and law enforcement information in the absence of an SAR.76 The Proposal
authorizes FIUs to request information from any obliged entity regardless of
whether an SAR has been filed. The Proposal delegates to the Member
States the task of defining the conditions under which FIUs can request
information."
FIUs must still respect security and confidentiality
requirements governing information access, handling, and dissemination."
Currently there is no obligation at the EU level to implement banking
registries or electronic data retrieval systems, which would provide FIUs
with access to bank account information. The 4AMLD encourages but does
not require these information systems; as a result, not all Member States
have these systems in place.79 Therefore, FIUs are challenged to detect
criminal and terrorist financial movements at the national level. The
70. See id.
71. See id. at 13.
72. See 4AMLD, supra note 64 at art. 12.
73. See Proposal, supra note 65 at 13.
74. The Proposal Directive specifies that "[t]he rule should be enacted in full compliance with
Union obligations in respect of international trade, especially the provisions of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services." Id. at 23.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 13 - 14.
77. Proposal, supra note 53, at 14.
78. Id.
79. See 4AMLD, supra note 52, at 57.
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Proposal modifies 4AMLD to require Member States to set up automated
centralized databases that enable FIUs to quickly identify bank account and
payment information. These systems would allow FIUs and other AML
authorities to identify all bank and payment accounts belonging to an
individual through a centralized automated search query.o Access to these
registries should be limited to a need-to-know basis and subject to maximum
retention periods for personal data.81
Under 4AMLD Article 18, obliged entities are required to apply enhanced
CDD to manage and mitigate risks when dealing with individuals or entities
in countries identified by the EU as high risk.82 Currently, each Member
State independently determines the enhanced CDD measures that are
appropriate for high-risk jurisdictions. This inconsistent and uncoordinated
approach by Member States creates vulnerability in monitoring these highrisk countries. Accordingly, the Proposal harmonizes the monitoring of
high-risk countries by requiring Member States to adopt a minimum
standard of enhanced CDD measures that are compliant with FATF
recommendations.83

Currently, companies, trusts, and other legal entities are required to
maintain accurate information on their beneficial ownership.84 Articles 30
and 31 of the 4AMLD provide guidance on the collection, storing, and access
to ultimate beneficial ownership information.5s The Proposal seeks to
synchronize these requirements across entities and Member States.
Stressing the importance of public access to information, the Proposal
amends Directive 2009/101/EC to require that Member States make
beneficial ownership of for-profit firms and legal entities publically
available.86 The Proposal asserts that public access to this information
results in enhanced scrutiny by society, provides additional guarantees to
potential business partners, and contributes to the integrity of business
80. Id.
81. Id. at 15
82. Article 9 of 4AMLD authorizes the Commission to identify high-risk third countries that
have deficient anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing controls. See 4AMLD,
supra note 52 at arts. 9, 18. The list of high-risk third countries was adopted in July 2016. See
Commission Delegated Regulation (EL) 2016/1675 of 14 July 2016 Supplementing Directive (EU)
2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council by Identifying High-Risk Third Countries
with Strategic Deficiencies, COM (2016) (July. 14, 2016).
83. The minimum enhanced due diligence standards should require checks on the customer,
identifying the purpose and nature of the business relationship as well as the source of funds,
and transaction monitoring. The enhanced due diligence measures should be fully compliant
with lists drafted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). In addition, the list of
countermeasures set out by FATF should be adequately reflected in the EU legislation. See
Proposal,supra note 53 at 15. The FATF is an intergovernmental body that sets standards and
promotes measures to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and other threats to the
financial system. See Who We Are, FIN AcnON TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/
(last visited Mar. 15, 2017).
84. Proposal,supra note 53, at 15.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 26.
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transactions and the financial system.8 7 The Proposal provides that trusts
engaged in commercial or business-like activity should also make beneficial
ownership information publically available.88 But the privacy concerns of
trusts created for charitable purposes or to hold family assets require that
beneficial ownership information be shared only with those who have a
legitimate interest.89

Finally, a beneficial owner according to Article 3(6)(a) of the 4AMLD is a
legal person owning twenty-five percent plus one share or an ownership
interest of more than twenty-five percent in a corporate entity.90 The
Proposal recommends lowering this threshold to ten percent for passive
non-financial entities.91 Passive non-financial entities do not create income
on their own, but function primarily as an intermediary to channel income
from other sources. 92 These entities may exist only to distance beneficial
owners from their assets, and accordingly present a high risk for money
laundering and tax evasion.93
5.

Iran's First Counter-TerrorismFinance Law

On March 17, 2016, the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) enacted its first
CTF law, known as The Law on Combating Terrorism Finance.94 The brief
law defines terrorist financing, outlines reporting obligations for banks and
financial agencies, and permits international cooperation.95 The Iranian
Parliament approved the law on February 2, 2016, and the Guardian
Council confirmed it on March 3, 2016.96

The promulgation of this law is an effort by the Iranian regime to adopt
international banking and AML standards and thereby modernize its
banking legislation in response to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(CPOA).97 The JCPOA was signed between Iran and the five permanent
members of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Russia,
87. Id. at 16.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 17. "The legitimate interest with respect to money laundering, terrorist
financing and the associated predicate offences should be justified by readily available means,
such as statutes or mission statement of non-governmental organisations, or on the basis of
demonstrated previous activities relevant to the fight against money laundering and terrorist
financing or associated predicate offences, or a proven track record of surveys or actions in that
field." Id. at 28.
90. Proposal, supra note 53, at 17.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See The Law on Combating Terrorism Finance (Iran), www.tejaratbank.ir/filemanager/
1659577/download/1/CFT-law.html.
95. Id.
96. See Ratification of the Law of Combating the Financingof Terrorirm (CF), CENTRAL BANK OF
-nm IsLAMic Ri.ui3uc OF IRAN (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.cbi.ir/showitem/14423.aspx.
97. Iranian officials have responded to these speculations by publishing a scanned picture of
the 2009 proposed bill of the previous administration. See, The Picture of the Bill of the Law on
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Germany, United States, and the United Kingdom) in July 2015 and
provides Iran with a multiyear plan for phased economic sanctions relief
upon the verification of Iran's implementation of certain nuclear
commitments.98 On January 16, 2016, the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) verified that Iran had implemented the key nuclear-related
measures required by the JCPOA.99
Iran's counter-terrorism finance law requires that authorities and law
enforcement personnel under the direction of a judicial authority identify
and block funds and assets procured and collected for terrorist activities.o00
Individuals and entities subject to the law are required to maintain records of
01
Any
suspicious transactions and customers for no less than five years.

suspicious activity must be reported to the High Commission of AntiMoney Laundering for further action.102 Knowingly or intentionally failing
to report suspicious activity can result in criminal liability.103 If the failure to
report suspicious activity is due to negligence, then some lesser punishment
may be imposed.

H.

Conclusion

VC regulation continues to challenge regulators, legislators, and law
enforcement. The anonymity and global reach of VC ensures that the threat
it poses to successful AML and CTF initiatives is unlikely to diminish.
Though there is little consensus on how to define, much less regulate VCs,
the initial wave of regulation is directed at intermediaries like VC exchanges
and virtual wallet providers.
Regulators focused this year on strengthening CDD programs and
implementing controls to capture beneficial ownership information. This
signals a distinct trend towards proactive information-driven monitoring as a
tool to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. Authorities
acknowledge that the global nature of the threat posed by money laundering
and terrorism requires cooperation among financial partners and across
Combating TerrorismFinance in Abmadi Nejhad'sAdministration,EGHTESAD ONLINE, (Sep. 5
2016).
98. See Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, https://
www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2017) (containing full text of the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and its annexes) [hereinafter JCPOA]; see also U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONs RELATING TO THE
LIFrING OF CERTAIN U.S. SANCTIONS UNDER THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF AcTION

(JCPOA) ON IMPLEMENTKYION DAY (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
sanctions/Programs/Documents/jcpoa-faqs.pdf.
99. See JCPOA Implementation, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (an. 16, 2016), https://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/
jcpoa_implementation.aspx.
100. See The Law on Combating Terrorism Finance, supra note 94 at art. 5.
101. Id. at art. 13.
102. Id. at art. 14.
103. Id. at Note 1.
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jurisdictions. Criminals and terrorists engaged in financial crimes will
continue to attempt to exploit opportunities that result from uncoordinated
or incompatible regulatory schemes.
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